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I. BUDDY SCHWARTZ AND THE AMERICAN DREAM

Mervin "Buddy" Schwartz, Jr., embodied the American Dream.
A Pennsylvania resident, Schwartz began working for Hershey Foods
in 1961 as a maintenance mechanic.' He eventually became a member
of the local union's executive board. 2 A hard worker providing for his
family, Schwartz had a thirteen-year perfect attendance record and
often worked overtime. 3 He even managed to attend night classes and
4
obtained an associate's degree in Bible studies.
Lacking any financial training, Buddy Schwartz relied on the
6
retirement plan and 401k 5 Hershey provided for his retirement.
Because he contributed the maximum allowable amount out of each
paycheck to his 401k, he was able to retire in 1999 at the age of sixty
with retirement assets worth approximately $284,000. 7 He rolled
Press Release, Ctr. for Justice & Democracy, News Conference Participants (July 31,
1.
2007) [hereinafter Press Release] (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
2.
Id.
3.
Statement of Buddy Schwartz, Ctr. For Justice & Democracy (July 31, 2007)
[hereinafter Statement of Buddy Schwartz] (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
4.
Press Release, supra note 1.
5.
A 401k, named after the Revenue Code section authorizing it, is a tax advantaged
retirement savings plan. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (2000) (laying out the requirements and benefits of a
401(k) plan).
6.
Id.
7.
Press Release, supra note 1.
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these assets over to Merrill Lynch so his son, James Schwartz, a
financial advisor, could manage them.8 Not only did he retire early,
but Buddy Schwartz and his wife, Louise, also were able to purchase a
retirement home in Arizona to be close to family. 9 For Buddy
Schwartz, the American Dream was coming true.
This all changed, however, when James called his father in
2000 to tell him about a hot growth stock 10 for a "fast-growing and
stable company" called Enron. 1 Relying on positive Merrill Lynch
analyst opinions, James advised his father to invest in Enron, which
12
he did by purchasing about $30,000 worth of preferred stock.
Imagine Schwartz's despair when the Enron scandal erupted in
2001, and he lost his initial investment and was forced to sell his
retirement home in Arizona. 13 Imagine his outrage when he discovered
that his brokerage firm, Merrill Lynch, was lying and scheming with
Enron to make its financial statements look more promising than they
actually were through fraudulent transactions. 14 Imagine his
heartbreak when the Fifth Circuit destroyed his American dream in
one stroke by failing to certify a nationwide class that would have
included Schwartz and other defrauded investors. According to the
court, the fraudulent actions did not give rise to primary liability
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.15
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act") prohibits the use of "any manipulative or deceptive
device ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 16 In
addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
promulgated Rule 10b-5 to provide an enforcement action against
those "employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" or
"engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business which [sic]
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person"
regarding the purchase or sale of any security. 17 Courts have found an
8. Statement of Buddy Schwartz, supra note 3.
9.
Id.
10. Growth stocks are generally identified as stocks whose earnings are expected to grow at
above average rates. These companies typically choose to reinvest their earnings into further
growth, rather than distributing the profits in the form of dividends. Investopedia, Growth Stock,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/growthstock.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
11. Statement of Buddy Schwartz, supra note 3.
12. Id.; Press Release, supra note 1.
13. Statement of Buddy Schwartz, supra note 3.
14. Id.
15. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372, 406 (5th
Cir. 2007) (declining to certify a nationwide class of investors).
16. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2000).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2008).
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implied private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 that is available to
private individuals like Schwartz. 8 However, in the case of secondary
actors such as, inter alia, banks, investment firms, attorneys, and
accountants, the Supreme Court thus far has dismissed claims for
"aiding and abetting" liability brought under either § 10(b) or Rule
10b-5. 19 As a result, a plaintiff such as Schwartz who wishes to bring a
claim against a secondary actor under § 10(b) must demonstrate that
the secondary actor behaved in such a way as to sustain a claim for
primary liability. 20 The Court has not clearly established what
plaintiffs must demonstrate to find a secondary actor primarily liable.
That question has consistently led to splits among the federal circuit
courts.
Originally, claims against secondary actors were brought under
Rule 10b-5(b) as misrepresentation claims. 2 1 In response to these
claims, the Second Circuit developed a restrictive Bright Line Test
that requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the secondary actor made
a false or misleading statement or omission that can be attributed to
him or her at the time of public dissemination. 22 The Ninth Circuit
developed an alternative standard, couched in terms of "aiders and
abettors," that finds liability where there is "(1) the existence of an
independent primary wrong, (2) actual knowledge or reckless
disregard by the aider and abettor of the wrong and of his or her role
in furthering it, and (3) substantial assistance in the wrong." 23 The
aider or abettor need not have committed any manipulative or
deceptive act, nor must the injured party have relied upon the aider or
abettor's assistance to the primary defrauder. 24 In addition to the
Ninth Circuit's test, the SEC has suggested its own Creator Test for
secondary actor liability, but this test has only been accepted in one
federal district court. 25 Under the Creator Test, when a person acts,
18. See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (explaining that
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not define a remedy expressly even though the statute
implies one).
19. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994)
(holding that § 10(b) does not allow a private right of action for aiding and abetting); see also
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008) (reaffirming
the lack of a private right of action for aiding and abetting).
20. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191.
21. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2nd Cir. 1998) (establishing the
Bright Line Test, discussed infra Part II.C.2.a); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 967
(C.D. Cal. 1994) (establishing the Substantial Participation Test, discussed infra Part II.C.2.c).
22. Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.
23. ZZZZ Best., 864 F. Supp. at 967.
24. Id.
25. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 591 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
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either individually or with others, with scienter 26 to create a
27
misrepresentation, that person is liable as a primary violator.
As it became more difficult to prevail with a Rule 10b-5(b)
misrepresentation claim, creative plaintiffs' attorneys began exploring
subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 for causes of action in relation to
schemes to defraud. 28 The Ninth Circuit adopted the Principal
Purpose Test, focusing on a secondary actor's level of involvement in a
fraudulent transaction. 29 The Eighth Circuit offered a narrower test,
only finding liability for an actor who had a duty to disclose
30
information and did not do so.
Further complicating matters is Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC, v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,31 a case in which the
Supreme Court addressed the meaning of a "deceptive act" as set forth
in Rule 10b-5(c). Although the Court facially rejected the Ninth
Circuit's Principal Purpose Test in favor of the Eighth Circuit's duty
approach, questions still linger regarding the ability to bring scheme32
to-defraud claims against secondary actors.
This Note attempts to discuss and analyze the evolution of
Rule 10b-5 secondary actor liability and focuses on developing a
singular standard that promotes certainty, efficiency, and deterrence,
while adequately compensating harmed investors like Schwartz.
33
While the compensatory function of Rule 10b-5 class action claims
has been questioned, this Note assumes that compensating defrauded
34
investors is a valid objective of any Rule 10b-5 reform.

26. Scienter is a "mental state consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (3rd Pocket ed. 2006).
27. Brief of the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 14, Klein v. Boyd, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
90,165 (3d Cir. 1998) (Nos. 97-1143; 97-1261) [hereinafter SEC Brief], available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefsfklein.txt.
28. Mark S. Pincus, Note, Circuit Split or a Matter of Semantics? The Supreme Court's
Upcoming Decision on Rule 10b-5 "Scheme Liability" and its Implications for Tax Shelter Fraud
Litigation, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 448-49 (2007).
29. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006).
30. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLS v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir.
2006).
31. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLS v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008).
32. In re Charter Communications, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 2006).
33. Although investors can bring a secondary actor Rule 10b-5 claim as individuals, the
reality is that most claims are brought as class actions. The reasons for this are varied, but
generally litigation costs versus potential reward play a heavy role in the decision. See Amanda
M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public
and PrivateEnforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1360 (2008) (discussing how it
may be uneconomical for smaller investors to bring Rule 10b-5 suits individually).
34. See, e.g., id. at 1313 (describing the compensatory function of Rule 10b-5 class actions as
merely pocket shifting with high transaction costs).
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Part II of this Note discusses the evolution of Rule 10b-5 and
secondary actor liability from its beginning as an SEC tool to regulate
the markets to its current status as a private right of action. Part III
analyzes the various circuit tests that have developed to address
secondary actor liability by highlighting their strengths and exposing
their weaknesses. Part IV proposes a new unitary standard that
combines the legislative spirit of § 10(b) with a proper remedy for
hardworking Americans like Schwartz who may be defrauded. Its
strength is its uniform application, which provides certainty and
dispels the current cloud of confusion over the various secondary actor
claims under Rule 10b-5. This Part also addresses various criticisms of
secondary actor liability, such as the high transaction costs imposed
on litigants and the potential for over-deterrence. Part V offers a few
concluding remarks.
II. ACORNS TO OAK TREES: MISSING THE TREES FOR THE FOREST
Securities law can be complex considering the multitude of
statutes that have developed over the years. It is easy to get lost in
securities regulation, so it is helpful to trace the progression of Rule
10b-5 from its humble beginnings as an acorn, to its current statusto continue the metaphor-as a dense forest. Only then can the need
for a unitary standard be fully understood.
A. The Creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission and its
Rule 1Ob-5 Role
1. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Prior to 1933, there was very little federal regulation of the
securities markets. 35 State laws, known as Blue Sky laws, were the
primary regulatory force behind securities transactions. 36 "Black
Tuesday," the day of the stock market crash of 1929, signaled a
downward spiral that ended in an 89.2 percent decline in the total

35. Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in
the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 497 (2003).
36. Id.
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value of the stock market. 37 This marked the beginning of the Great
3
Depression.
The Great Depression was a cause of major concern for
Congress, the body ultimately responsible for regulating the securities
markets under its legislative powers and the Commerce Clause. 39 In
response to decreased investor confidence in American banking,
business, and investment practices, which one commentator has
compared to some headlines in the twenty-first century, 40 Congress
enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate the secondary
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets. 41 The Act was
promulgated to "protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the
Federal [sic] taxing power, to protect and make more effective the
national banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure
[sic] the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such
transactions. '' 42 This Act, along with the Securities Act of 1933,
"embrace[s] a fundamental purpose ...to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor." 4 3 Realizing that
effective market maintenance would require specialized knowledge,
Congress delegated broad rulemaking authority under the Act to the
44
newly created Securities and Exchange Commission.
2. The Mission of the Securities and Exchange Commission
The Securities and Exchange Commission is the federal agency
tasked with maintaining the specialized body of knowledge necessary
to regulate the securities markets. 45 Specifically, the SEC mission

37. The figure of 89.2% is measured by the drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average from
381.17 points to 41.22 by July of 1932. See Associated Press, It Takes a Long Time for a Market
Recovery, Oct. 13, 2008, available at http://www.dcexaminer.com/ap/?c=y&id=920294.
38. Id.
39. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce... among
the several States," which includes interstate securities markets. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
40. See Gary M. Brown, Scheme Supreme: Will the Supreme Court Absolve the "Secondary
Actors" Who Are the Real Culprits in Recent Corporate Scandals? 3 (2007), available at
(comparing
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2007/10/20071015-scheme-supreme.pdf
public opinion of the finance industry during the time of the enactment of the Exchange Act to
modern public opinion of the industry).
41. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2000).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180,186 (1963)).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78(d).
45. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARv. L. REV. 963, 964-1008 (1994)
(discussing the role of the SEC in developing securities law).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

282

[Vol. 62:1:275

statement lists its goals as "protect[ing] investors, maintain[ing] fair,
46
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitat[ing] capital formation."
47
To this end, the SEC sees itself as the "Investor's Advocate."
The SEC has developed a policy that coincides with that of the
Securities Acts, focusing on disclosure rather than on meritorious
review of securities issues. 48 The basis for such a policy lies in the
semi-strong form of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis. 49 Under
this theory of finance, the price of a security reflects all publicly
available information about a firm.50 As new information becomes
available, it is quickly incorporated into the market price of the
stock. 51 This theory supports the SEC's disclosure approach because
fair public disclosure leads, in theory, to fair pricing.
3. Promulgation of Rule 10b-5 by the Securities and
Exchange Commission
In 1942, the SEC sought to "close[] a loophole in the protections
against fraud.., by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying
securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase." 52 Previously, the
Commission's rules against fraud only applied to brokers and
dealers. 53 The SEC thus promulgated Rule 10b-5 in order to eliminate
fraud in the purchase or sale of securities by any party. 54 Rule 10b-5
broadly prohibits employing any device or scheme to defraud, making
a false statement of material fact, making misleading statements due

46. U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm., The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects
Formation,
Capital
and
Facilitates
Integrity,
Market
Maintains
Investors,
http://www.sec.govfabout/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2008).
47. The SEC's self-stated mission is "to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation." Id.
48.

Id.

49. The three forms of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis ("ECMH") are weak, semistrong, and strong. The weak form assumes that there is no information that can be gleaned
from past price data to outperform a buy-and-hold strategy for a stock. The semi-strong form
assumes that the market quickly and efficiently incorporates all known public information into
the price of a stock, so the only way to beat a buy-and-hold strategy would be to have inside
information. The strong form assumes that the price of a stock incorporates, quickly and
efficiently, all public and non-public information about the issuer. See Roger J. Dennis,
Materialityand the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 373, 375-81 (1984) (evaluating the three forms of the ECMH).
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253-55 (1988) (discussing the ECMH).
52. Exchange Act Release No. 3230, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804, 3804 (May 21, 1942).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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to omitted material facts, or engaging in any fraudulent practice in
55
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
The reverberations of this rule have been profound. 56 What
began as an enforcement mechanism at the SEC's disposal has been
judicially interpreted as a private right of action for any buyer or
seller of a security against any party who fraudulently induces him or
her to proceed with the transaction, even if the defendant is not a
direct party to the transaction. 57 Much jurisprudence has developed
from this implied right; in fact, Justice William Rehnquist called the
private right of action under Rule 10b-5 "a judicial oak which [sic] has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn."58 It is this judicial
oak that has since splintered into the various circuit tests at issue in
this Note. Before analyzing these tests, one must examine how and
why the Court allowed plaintiffs to pursue class action status under
Rule 10b-5.

55. Rule 10b-5 states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2008). Interestingly, nothing in the text of the rule precludes secondary
liability by limiting liability to the seller or purchaser.
56. Daniel M. Hawke, SEC Historical Soc'y, Roundtable on Enforcement: A Brief History of
the SEC's Enforcement Program 1934-1981, at l1,(Sept. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/oralHistories/roundtables/enforcement/enforcementHistor
y.pdf (discussing how Rule 10b-5 allowed the SEC to prevent fraud beyond the mere brokerdealer context).
57. See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (finding an
implied private right of action for Rule 10b-5).
58. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
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B. Fraudon the Market and Reliance: How Basic v. Levinson Signaled
an Expansive Era for Plaintiffs'Ability to Pursue a PrivateRight of
Action
The Supreme Court initially was receptive to broad arguments
under Rule 10b-5. In a private federal securities action involving
publicly traded securities, the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim 59 usually
include: a material misrepresentation or omission; 60 scienter; 61 a
connection to a purchase or sale of a security; 62 reliance, often referred
to as "transaction causation"; 63 loss causation; 64 and economic loss.6 5
In Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court opened the door to
plaintiffs seeking class action certification under a Rule 10b-5 claim by
creating a fraud-on-the-market presumption to establish the reliance
element of the private action. 66 In Basic, Basic, Inc., ("Basic"), a
publicly traded company, conducted merger discussions with
Combustion Engineering, Inc., ("Combustion"), starting in September
1976.67 In three separate public statements made in 1977 and 1978,
Basic denied that these discussions ever took place. 68 In December
1978, Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading
on its shares and released an announcement that it had been
approached by a company to negotiate a merger. 69 Several Basic
shareholders who sold their stock between the time of the first public
statement that denied merger discussions and the later suspension of
trading brought suit, claiming they were harmed by an artificially
70
deflated price caused by the misleading statements.

59. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (discussing the Rule 10b5 elements).
60. Materiality is a fact-sensitive inquiry based on the significance a reasonable investor
would place on the withheld or misrepresented information. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 240 (1988) (discussing materiality).
61. In re Software Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 1994) (defining scienter as "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud").
62. Dura Pharm.Inc., 544 U.S. at 342.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988); see Mary M. Caskey, Note, Lifting
the Fog: Findinga Clear StandardofLiability for Secondary Actors under Rule 10b-5, 41 VAL. U.
L. REV. 403, 414-16 (2006) (describing the fraud on the market theory as the "most widely used
method of proving reliance").
67. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 226-27.
68. Id. at 227.
69. Id. at 227-28.
70. Id. at 228.
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The Supreme Court approved a rebuttable presumption of
reliance for fraud-on-the-market, holding that the presumption is
consistent with the purposes of § 10(b) because it facilitates Rule 10b5 litigation.7 1 The Court further held that "[a]ny showing that severs
the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price
received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair
72
market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance."
Basic is significant because it provides a way for plaintiffs to certify
their case as a class action without showing individual reliance upon
the misrepresentations or omissions made by the defendant-a
difficult, if not impossible, task. In the wake of Basic, it appeared that
Rule 10b-5 protection for individual investors was expanding.
C. Liability for Secondary Actors: Enteringthe Forest
1. CentralBank and its Impact on Secondary Liability
73
The era of an expansive Rule 10b-5 was short-lived.
Traditionally, secondary liability claims were brought under aiding
and abetting causes of action, 74 born out of general concepts of tort
law. 75 However, questions about the continued availability of
secondary liability claims emerged when the Supreme Court began
focusing more closely on the statutory text of § 10(b) and,
consequently, its progeny, Rule 10b-5.7 6 Gradually, various lower court
decisions began to restrict and eventually eliminate aiding and
abetting liability under § 10(b), signaling that the era of expansive
77
plaintiffs' rights was ending.
71. Id. at 245.
72. Id. at 248.
73. Indeed, even before Basic, the Court criticized broad class actions under Rule 10b-5 as
being "light years away" from the original tort of misrepresentation and deceit. Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975).
74. See Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing the test to
determine liability as an aider and abettor of a violation of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5); Kerbs v. Fall
River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974) ("Under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 knowing
assistance of or participation in a fraudulent scheme gives rise to liability equal to that of the
perpetrators themselves.").
75. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
76. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (noting that the "starting
point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself'); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976) ("Ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the
standard of liability created by a particular section of the Acts must therefore rest primarily on
the language of that section.").
77. See Akin v. Q-L Invs., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992) ("There is a powerful
argument that.., aider and abettor liability should not be enforceable by private parties
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The Supreme Court stifled plaintiffs' ability to bring claims
against secondary actors in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, holding that Rule 10b-5 does not encompass aiding
and abetting liability. In Central Bank, the Colorado Springs-Stetson
Hills Public Building Authority ("Authority") issued twenty-six million
dollars worth of bonds in 1986 and 1988 to finance public
improvements, with Central Bank of Denver ("Central Bank") serving
as indenture trustee. 78 The developer AmWest Development
("AmWest") was responsible, per the bond covenants, for providing
evidence that the land was worth a minimum of 160 percent of the
value of the bond issues 79 and giving annual updated appraisals to
Central Bank.8 0 In 1988, Central Bank became aware that the lands
might not be worth 160 percent of the value of the bonds, but after
discussions with AmWest, Central Bank delayed obtaining an
independent appraisal for six months.8 1 Unfortunately, the Authority
defaulted on the 1988 bonds before the independent appraisal was
conducted.8 2 First Interstate Bank of Denver ("FIB") and Jack Naber,
holders of 2.1 million dollars worth of the defaulted 1988 bonds,
brought suit against Central Bank, claiming that Central Bank had
aided and abetted in the fraud by delaying the independent
appraisal.8 3 The Supreme Court held that the statutory language of §
10(b), the basis for Rule 10b-5, does not encompass aiding and
abetting liability.84 It reached this conclusion by comparing the
Exchange Act containing § 10(b) to other acts of Congress that clearly
showed an intent to create aiding and abetting liability, and it found
such an intent lacking in § 10(b).8 5 The Court then went a step
further, noting that no other private causes of action under the
Exchange Act supported allowing aiding and abetting liability.8 6 The

pursuing an implied right of action."); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d
490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring a manipulative or deceptive act to be liable under § 10(b)). See
generally Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 1 O(b) of the Securities Act of 1934,
69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 81 (1981) (discussing secondary liability and § 10(b)).
78. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 167 (1994).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 168. This fact is significant because by the end of the six month delay, the 1988
bond issue was already closed out.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 191; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (showing Congress's ability to clearly delineate
an aiding and abetting regime).
85. Cent. Bank ofDenver, 511 U.S. at 176-77.
86. Id. at 179 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 78i, 78p, 78r); cf. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 25(a)(1) (creating a private aiding and abetting cause of action).
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Supreme Court even rejected the SEC's amicus curiae policy argument
that allowing aiding and abetting would deter secondary actors from
participating in a fraudulent activity. The Court stated that such
liability "exacts costs that may disserve the goals of fair dealing and
efficiency in the securities markets,"' 7 noting that the nature of
secondary liability "demands certainty and predictability."8 8 The Court
then went on to discuss the ripple effect that would be created if there
were a broad basis for liability because small businesses would be
unable to afford professional advice. 8 9 Further, businesses that could
afford professional advice would pass the additional costs to their
clients and their investors, whom the statutes were meant to protect. 90
The Central Bank Court did, however, state that defrauded
parties are not without a remedy, explaining that lawyers,
accountants, and bankers may nevertheless be liable as primary
violators, "assuming all of the requirements for primary liability
under Rule 10b-5 are met."91
The Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank seemed to sound
the death knell for secondary liability claims by imposing a higher
burden on plaintiffs attempting to recover from secondary actors.
Rather than simply demonstrating the three elements necessary for
an aiding and abetting claim, plaintiffs must now demonstrate a
primary violation of Rule 10b-5 to survive a motion to dismiss. 92 This
is a tall order indeed.
2. The Circuit Split over Rule 10b-5(b) Misrepresentation Claims
Plaintiffs responded to Central Bank primarily by filing
misrepresentation claims under Rule 10b-5(b) against secondary
actors. 93 Yet federal circuit courts struggled with how to respond to
87. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188; see also Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 16-17, Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511
U.S. 164 (1994) (No. 92-854) (discussing various SEC policies supporting secondary liability
under Rule 10b-5).
88. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 188.
89. Id. at 189.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 191.
92. The three elements of an "aiding and abetting cause of action in the Tenth Circuit [are]:
(1) a primary violation of § 10(b); (2) recklessness by the aider and abettor as to the existence of
the primary violation; and (3) substantial assistance given to the primary violator by the aider
and abettor." Id. at 168 (citing First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898903 (1992)).
93. See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 1998) (charging
Ernst & Young, the outside auditor for BT Office Products, with making "materially false and
misleading financial statements to the public"); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720-21 (2d Cir.
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these claims in light of Central Bank. This struggle has produced four
different approaches to distinguishing primary liability from aiding
and abetting in a Rule 10b-5(b) misrepresentation claim. The Second
Circuit developed the Bright Line Test; the Ninth Circuit announced
the Substantial Participation Test; the Tenth Circuit announced an
Anixter Test; and the SEC has proposed its own test, in what has
become known as the Creator (or Creation) Test.
a. Bright Line Test
By focusing on whether the defendant made a false or
misleading statement, the Bright Line Test seeks to create an easy-toapply standard. The Second Circuit announced this test in Shapiro v.
Cantor94 and refined it further in Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP.95 The
Shapiro court opined that
if Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make a false or
misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b). Anything short of
such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how
substantial that aid may
96
be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b).

It further required that the defendant knows or should know that his
or her misrepresentation or omission would reach potential
97
investors.
In Wright, the plaintiffs brought suit against Ernst & Young as
a secondary actor for damages caused by the release of misleading
financial statements by a company for whom Ernst & Young served as
an outside auditor. 98 The court refused to find liability under the
Bright Line Test, noting that the misrepresentation must be
attributed to the defendant at the time of public dissemination. 99 In
this case, the press release was not attributed to Ernst & Young, as

1997) (examining plaintiffs joinder of Touche Ross & Co.); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77
F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 1996) (examining judgments against Home-Stake's outside auditor for
violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); In re Software Toolworks Inc. v. Painewebber Inc., 50 F.3d 615,
620 (9th Cir. 1994) (bringing a class action against underwriters and auditors); In re Enron Corp.
Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 563-64 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (bringing suit
against accounting firms, law firms, and investment banks/integrated financial services
institutions).
94. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720-21.
95. Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.
96. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720 (quoting In re MTC Elec. Techs. S'holders Litig., 898 F. Supp.
974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
97. Id.
98. Wright, 152 F.3d at 171.
99. Id. at 175.

2009]

PRIMARY LIABILITY FOR SECONDARYACTORS

289

the outside auditor merely failed to prevent the misleading statements
from being released but did not make the misrepresentation. 100
b. Anixter Test
The Tenth Circuit test, set out in Anixter v. Home-Stake
Production Co., is similar to the Second Circuit's Bright Line Test. In
Anixter, Home-Stake offered its investors oil and gas investments that
were actually elements of a Ponzi scheme: later investments financed
the "returns" for earlier investors. 10 1 Defrauded investors brought suit
against, inter alia, Cross, the independent auditor who prepared
documents for use by Home-Stake in SEC filings and other financial
releases.1 0 2 The court held that, for a plaintiff to prevail against a
secondary actor for misrepresentation, he or she must prove: (1) that
the defendant made an untrue statement of material fact or omitted a
material fact, (2) that the conduct occurred in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, (3) that the defendant made the
statement or omission with scienter, and (4) that the plaintiff relied on
the misrepresentation and sustained damages as a proximate result of
the misrepresentation. 10 3 Further, to establish the connection to a
purchase or sale of a security, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant knew or should have known that his or her statement or
10 4
omission would be communicated to investors.
Applying its new test, the court held that the independent
auditor Cross could be found liable because, while acting as HomeStake's independent auditor, he certified Home-Stake's financial
statements and distributed his certifications and opinions widely in
prospectuses, annual reports, and registration statements. 0 5 An
expert also testified in the case that Cross knew or should have known
that the statements were misleading and would reach potential
1 06
investors.
c. Substantial ParticipationTest
The Ninth Circuit endorses a very broad Substantial
Participation Test, developed in In re Software Toolworks Inc. v.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Id.

290

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1:275

Painewebber Inc. 10 7 The plaintiffs in Painewebberwere investors in a
secondary public offering of a software firm whose stock became
available at eighteen dollars and fifty cents per share.10 8 They brought
suit three months later when a press release about substantial losses
caused the stock to plummet to two dollars and thirty-eight cents per
share. 10 9 Among the claims they alleged was a Rule 10b-5(b) violation
against the firm's auditor, Deloitte & Touche, in relation to a
fraudulent letter filed with the SEC claiming there were no quarterly
financial data available. 1 0
The court stated that an actor need not "make" the misleading
statements, but merely "substantially participate" in the preparation
of the statements, or otherwise be "intricately involved" in their
preparation, to be found liable. 1 ' In what is essentially a scienter
element, the actor also must know, or be reckless in not knowing, that
11 2
the information constitutes a material misrepresentation.
The court held that although the plaintiffs' claim against
Deloitte & Touche was similar to aiding and abetting, which Central
Bank prohibits, the claim could proceed because the complaint alleged
primary liability violations as well. 113 Specifically, one of the letters to
the SEC stated that the letter " 'was prepared after extensive review
and discussions with... Deloitte' and actually referred the SEC to two
Deloitte partners for further information," which tended to show
substantial participation in the misrepresentation.1 14 Further, the
court held that a reasonable fact finder could infer that Deloitte had
access to the quarterly financial data and either knew or should have
known that the letter to the SEC was false, satisfying the last element
15
of the test."
d. Creator Test
The SEC developed its own interpretation of the proper role of
Rule 10b-5 private actions and secondary actors in an amicus brief
filed in Klein v. Boyd. Under the SEC's Creator Test, a secondary actor
is liable when, acting alone or in concert with others, he or she creates

107. In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994).
108. Id. at 620.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 628 n.3.
112. Id. at 629.
113. Id. at 628 n.3.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 629.
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a misrepresentation and has the requisite scienter. 116 The SEC
included explanatory hypotheticals to demonstrate that an actor could
be primarily liable if he or she writes misrepresentations for inclusion
in a document given to investors, even if the ideas came from
somebody else. 11 7 An actor who writes a truthful section for an
otherwise fraudulent document, however, will not be held liable for
misrepresentations in other parts of the document because that actor
did not "create" those misrepresentations.1 1 8
In the era of the Enron scandal, the Creator Test has only been
adopted in one Texas district court.1 19 In In re Enron Corporation
Securities, the court deferred to the SEC under traditional
administrative law principles, concluding that the SEC's Creator Test
was not arbitrary or capricious.1 20 It hailed the Creator Test as
balancing the rights of fraud victims against the need to protect
secondary parties from meritless suits. 1 21 The court criticized
approaches that limit liability solely to misrepresentations, omissions,
and a few "very technical forms of manipulation."'1 22
3. The Circuit Split over Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Scheme-to-Defraud
Claims
In response to the increased difficulty in bringing a Rule 10b5(b) claim against secondary actors, plaintiffs began making creative
arguments to pursue claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), alleging the
existence of fraudulent schemes.' 23 The courts of appeals again split,
creating more confusion over secondary actor liability: the Ninth
Circuit announced the Principal Purpose Test, while the Eighth
Circuit used the narrower Duty Test.

116. The "requisite scienter" loosely means deliberately or recklessly. SEC Brief, supra note
27, at 14.
117. Id. at 13-14.
118. Id. at 14-15.
119. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 588 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 590.
122. Id. at 589 n.31.
123. Mark S. Pincus, Note, Circuit Split or a Matter of Semantics? The Supreme Court's
Upcoming Decision on Rule 10b-5 "Scheme Liability" and its Implications for Tax Shelter Fraud
Litigation, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 448-49 (2007).
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a. PrincipalPurpose Test
The California State Teachers' Retirement System ("CalSTRS")
brought a scheme-to-defraud claim in Simpson v. AOL Time Warner
against Homestore.com under Rule 10b-5(a) and (C).124 CalSTRS
alleged that Homestore.com initially overstated its revenues by $170
million and that AOL Time Warner ("AOL"), engaged in fraudulent
sham transactions with Homestore.com, which essentially allowed
Homestore.com to purchase its own revenue. 125 Homestore.com would
then record this fake revenue as an asset on the financial statements
126
it reported to the SEC.
Addressing the scheme-to-defraud claim, the court stated that
the Ninth Circuit looks to whether the actor has committed a
manipulative or deceptive act to find liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and
(c). To be liable for engaging in a "scheme to defraud," the actor must
have "engaged in conduct that had the principal purpose and effect of
1 27 It
creating a false appearance of fact in furtherance of the scheme.'
is not enough that an actor participate in a transaction that has a
deceptive purpose and effect, however; the actor's own conduct must
128
have had a deceptive purpose and effect.
The court went on to hold that CalSTRS failed to show that
AOL had acted with the principal purpose and effect of creating a false
appearance in furtherance of a scheme. 129 AOL's transactions with
Homestore.com could be legitimate; it was only after Homestore.com
manipulated its relationship with third-party vendors that AOL's
transactions became fraudulent. 130 Thus, CalSTRS could not
demonstrate that the "principal purpose" of the transactions was
deception. The court held that dismissal of the claims against the
13
other third-party vendors was appropriate for similar reasons. '
b. Duty Test
The Eighth Circuit established a much narrower view of
liability for secondary actors in Stoneridge Investment Partners,LLC
124. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1048.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1053.
130. Id.; see also In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Any
deceptiveness resulted from the manner in which Parmalat or its auditors described the
transactions on Parmalat's balance sheets and elsewhere.").
131. Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1053-54.
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v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 132 The plaintiffs filed suit under § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, alleging that Charter
Communications' ("Charter") suppliers, Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and
Motorola, Inc., participated in a scheme to defraud Charter
shareholders. 133 The scheme involved selling cable converter boxes to
Charter at inflated prices. 134 The suppliers then "refunded" the extra
money by purchasing advertising with Charter. 135 The suppliers
produced falsely backdated documents to make the transactions look
unrelated in an effort to deceive Charter's auditor.1 36
The district court granted the suppliers' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 137 The Eighth
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the defendants engaged
in a scheme to defraud by "engaging in a 'course of business which
[sic] operates ... as a fraud or deceit.' "138 The court reasoned, "A
device or contrivance is not 'deceptive,' within the meaning of § 10(b),
absent some misstatement or a failure to disclose by one who has a
duty to disclose. ' 139 The court went on to find no duty between the
suppliers and Charter's investors and, subsequently, no liability. 140
The court also clarified that "manipulative," as used in § 10(b), is a
term of art that refers to transactions that artificially affect market
price, such as wash sales and rigged pricing. 141
In Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse, the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged the split between the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits and elected to follow the Eighth Circuit's Duty Test.1 42 The
plaintiffs, including Buddy Schwartz, alleged that the defendant
banks participated in a fraudulent scheme with Enron by structuring
illogical
transactions
and
manipulating
Enron's
financial
statements.1 43 After discussing relevant precedent, 144 the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant banks doing business with Enron had no duty
132. In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 987-93 (2006).
133. Id. at 989-90.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 993.
138. Id. at 991.
139. Id. at 992.
140. Id. at 992-93.
141. Id. at 990.
142. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372, 386-87 (5th
Cir. 2007).
143. Id. at 377.
144. Id. at 386-90. See supra note 21 (discussing two cases that the Fifth Circuit relied on to
support its duty requirement for a finding of liability).
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to the plaintiffs and that only Enron had a duty of disclosure. 14 5 At
most, the court was willing to believe that the banks could be guilty of
aiding and abetting, neither of which establishes a claim under § 10(b)
146
or Rule 10b-5.
4. Stoneridge Investment Partnersand Scheme Liability
The Supreme Court recently addressed the circuit split over
Rule 10b-5 (a) and (c) scheme liability in Stoneridge Investment
Partners,LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 147 which was on appeal from
the Eighth Circuit case mentioned supra. The Supreme Court also
rejected the plaintiffs narrow interpretation of Central Bank and
scheme liability, utilizing a somewhat different analytical framework.
It first reiterated that the plaintiffs reliance "is an essential element
of the § 10(b) private cause of action."'' 48 The Court then discussed two
presumptions of reliance: the fraud-on-the-market presumption, as
announced in Basic, and the Eighth Circuit's duty-based presumption
at issue when an actor has a duty to disclose material information to
the market and omits a material fact. 149 The Court went on to hold
that because Charter's vendors were dealing in the market for goods
and services and not in the market for financial investments, their
deceptive acts were too remote to have persuaded the Stoneridge
investors to purchase Charter securities. 150 The Court thus affirmed
the Eighth Circuit's decision and effectively eliminated the Principal
Purpose Test for scheme liability.
The Court also expressed reservation over expanding the
judicially created private cause of action because of Congress's
perceived refusal to do so through the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 15 1 discussed infra in subsection D.
Citing both the text of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (the codification of § 10(b))
and former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's testimony before the
Senate Securities Subcommittee, the Court assumed that "Congress
accepted the § 10(b) private cause of action as [defined during the
enactment of the PSLRA] but chose to extend it no further."'152 This

145. Id. at 390.
146. Id.
147. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770-75 (2008).
148. Id. at 769.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 769-70.
151. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
152. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768-79, 773.
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indicates that any additional expansion of Rule 10b-5 claims will have
to come from Congress, at least in the short term. This result also
cripples plaintiffs' ability to bring creative scheme-to-defraud claims
under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).
D. CongressionalResponses
The judiciary is not alone in its attempts to refine the Rule 10b5 doctrine; Congress has tipped its hand in a few ways that have
consequences for plaintiffs like Buddy Schwartz. First, Congress
passed the PSLRA, which imposed a number of requirements on
securities plaintiffs. Congress later passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
("SOX"), which holds import for this discussion because of its Fair
Funds provision.
In the early 1990s, Congress was increasingly persuaded by
scholarship suggesting that private securities litigation had
transaction costs that were too high. 153 In response, Congress enacted
the PSLRA. Among its provisions is a heightened pleading
requirement for Rule 10b-5 claims, requiring that the "complaint []
specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and
belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed." 154 If there is a state-of-mind requirement, then
the complaint shall also "state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind." 155 As a result of the PSLRA, it is now easier to dispose of Rule
10b-5 claims upon a motion to dismiss. 156
In addition to the PSLRA, Congress passed SOX in 2002 to
reform securities litigation. The so-called "Fair Funds" provision of
SOX allows the SEC, in an enforcement action, to distribute any
153. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 726-27 (1986) (criticizing the class action method of enforcement as being
economically inefficient); Rose, supra note 33, at 1318-20 (discussing the history of the PSLRA);
see also Brown, supra note 40, at 15 (quoting Bankers Ethics, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2005, at A16)
(criticizing the class action mechanism as primarily shifting money to the attorneys involved).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2000).
155. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
156. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3); Rose, supra note 33, at 1319. Although the PSLRA also created a safe
harbor for forward-looking statements, it is not particularly relevant to this discussion because
this safe harbor would still not protect fraudulent statements. See Ann Morales Olazabal, Safe
Harborfor Forward-Looking Statements Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: What's Safe and What's Not?, 105 DICK. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (2000) (discussing the PSLRA safe
harbor provision).
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disgorged profits from a securities violator to the victims. 157 This
provision has been touted as indirectly motivating the SEC to seek
158
stiffer fines against certain market professionals.

III. MOVING TOWARDS A UNITARY STANDARD OF SECONDARY ACTOR
LIABILITY: SCRUTINIZING THE CIRCUIT TESTS IN LIGHT OF POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
The evolution of Rule 10b-5 reveals several foundational
principles underlying the securities markets and their regulation.
Understanding these principles is essential to analyzing the various
circuit tests. Among these principles are fairness, 159 honesty,
increased
disclosure, certainty, predictability, and economic
efficiency.160 This Part analyzes each of the circuit tests for
misrepresentation or omission and scheme liability in light of the
preceding themes.
A. Rule 1Ob-5(b) MisrepresentationClaim Tests
1. Bright Line Test
The Second Circuit's Bright Line Test attempts to embrace the
concepts of certainty and predictability. This test clearly delineates
that the actor must make a false or misleading statement in order to
be found liable. 161 However, the Bright Line Test has been criticized
for its ambiguous use of the word "make." The test requires that the
defendant "make" a false or misleading statement with actual or
constructive knowledge that his or her representation will reach
potential investors. 62 While purporting to establish a predictable
bright line rule, this approach overlooks a fundamental problem: it
fails to address whether the actor need only assist in the preparation

157. 15 U.S.C. § 7246; 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1100-06 (2008).
158. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics:An Empirical Model,
53 DUKE L.J. 737, 754 (2003).
159. Any viable solution must appropriately balance the need to protect investors from
fraudulent information and the need to protect businesses against meritless strike suits. This
balancing act is often discussed in terms of overdeterrence or underdeterrence. See Rose, supra
note 33, at 1303-06.
160. I use "economic efficiency" broadly to indicate any situation where resources are being
used at their maximum level of utility, including maximizing judicial resources, reducing
plaintiffs' litigation costs, etc.
161. Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997).
162. Caskey, supra note 66, at 442.
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of misleading documents or whether the actor must personally draft
the misleading statement to be liable. It is also unclear what result
occurs if the actor is merely transcribing what another person is
telling him. The ambiguous nature of this test makes it less than a
bright line rule, and thus the test fails to fully embrace certainty or
predictability. 163
The Bright Line Test does have the benefit of increasing
economic efficiency, however. Attorneys, accountants, bankers, and
similar professionals can provide their services without fear of reprisal
because they have advance knowledge of their exposure to liability
based upon whether they are making a false or misleading statement
that they expect to be publicly disseminated. If there is any question
as to the honesty of any disclosures, the secondary actor has the
option to associate himself with the suspect documents or statements
or not. Being able to judge exposure to liability would significantly
enhance economic efficiency because a secondary actor could
potentially raise his rates when business dealings posed a greater risk
of legal liability and maintain normal fees when dealings involve full
and honest disclosure. Ideally, all disclosures should be full, fair, and
honest, but this risk-shifting passes higher costs to firms seeking
secondary parties to assist in defrauding the public while protecting
the public at large from the higher prices predicted by the court in
CentralBank.
Additionally, the requirement that the actor knows, or should
know, that the misrepresentation will reach potential investors 164
further increases economic efficiency. Outside professionals involved
in creating documents not meant for public dissemination do not have
to worry about liability that might, for example, be possible under a
broad scope of liability similar to that in the Substantial Participation
Test. Because there would be no liability if no potential investors are
involved, the fees charged for services would likely be lower.
However, the Bright Line Test has been criticized frequently
for creating what has been called a "safe harbor."16 5 The Wright court
held that a misleading statement must be attributed to the alleged
wrongdoer at the time of its public dissemination, and it is precisely
this attribution requirement that the SEC and others have criticized

163. The SEC has attempted to address the ambiguity of "makes" in their Creator Test. See
infra Part III.A.4 (describing the elements of the Creator Test).
164. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720.
165. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 587 (S.D. Tex.
2002) (quoting SEC Brief, supra note 27).
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as being too protective. 166 This requirement creates a safe harbor
whereby a cunning wrongdoer will not be exposed to liability if he
simply avoids the association of his name with the misleading
statement at the time of its dissemination, 167 regardless of his actual
responsibility. This creates an end run around the goals of fairness,
honesty, and full disclosure. However, the goal of economic efficiency
still is maximized if a secondary actor takes advantage of the safe
harbor by declining to be associated with the misleading documents or
statements because only the business issuing the misleading
documents or statements assumes the risk of legal liability. Thus the
secondary actor will not charge inflated prices because there is no
additional risk or legal liability.
2. Anixter Test
The Anixter Test is similar in many aspects to the Bright Line
Test, and the two tests share many of the same praises and criticisms.
The primary difference is that the Anixter Test does not have an
attribution requirement. It only requires the plaintiff to prove that: (1)
the defendant made an untrue statement of material fact or omitted a
material fact; (2) the conduct occurred in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security; (3) the defendant made the statement or omission
with scienter; and (4) the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation,
168
sustaining damages as a proximate result of the misrepresentation.
Secondary actors making a misleading statement can be held liable,
even if their names are nowhere on the document. The effect is
twofold: first, economic efficiency may decrease if a broad scope of
liability affects the willingness of professionals to assist in document
preparation at a reasonable cost; and second, investors are more likely
to trust the integrity and fairness of the market. With an increased
likelihood of legal liability under this broad standard, professionals
likely will charge their customer businesses higher prices, resulting in
higher transaction costs that will trickle through the economy.
However, with a broader range of liability, investors are more likely to
166. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (refusing to use the
attribution requirement); In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 587; (calling the attribution
requirement "too expansive"); SEC Brief, supra note 27, at 14 (criticizing the attribution
requirement).
167. The court discusses another case where an accountant is not held liable for only
"reviewing and approving" financial statements, which indicates that attribution requires the
actor to have written the material. See In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F.
Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994) (refusing to find Price Waterhouse liable unless they actually
"engag[ed] in the reporting of financial statements").
168. See supraPart II.C.2.b (describing the four factors of the Anixter Test).
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trust the accuracy of information in the market because businesses,
fearing liability, are more likely to disclose fully and honestly.
Like the Bright Line Test, the Anixter analysis also suffers
from the ambiguous use of the word "make" when it bases liability on
those who make a misleading statement. 169 Without a more definite
explanation of the exact conduct that the test prohibits, this test fails
to offer the level of certainty and predictability sought by the Supreme
Court. Secondary actors have no guarantee that what was previously
acceptable conduct would not suddenly be judicially held to be
prohibited conduct constituting the "making" of an untrue statement.
3. Substantial Participation Test
In contrast to the "narrowness" criticisms of the Bright Line
and Anixter Tests, the Substantial Participation Test has been
criticized as too broad.170 The primary concern with the Ninth Circuit's
approach is that there is no bright line establishing where liability
begins or ends. The ambiguity of the term "substantial participation"
curtails Central Bank's goals of certainty and predictability. It is
possible for an actor with a seemingly minimal role to be found equally
as liable as the primary violator because he "substantially
participated" in preparing the misleading statements. This offends
traditional concepts of justice and culpability. Further, professionals
are dissuaded from providing services to businesses because there is
no way to establish how much risk of legal liability exists. 171 This
creates incentives for costs to be passed on to the public as the Court
feared in Central Bank. Moreover, this not only could result in
increased costs, but could, as one commentator suggests, actually
172
decrease the ability of firms to provide full and fair disclosure.
The Ninth Circuit test shies away from the reliance
requirement typically inherent in Rule 10b-5 claims. 173 Because
secondary actors can be found liable without any showing that the

169. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996).
170. See Caskey, supra note 66, at 442 (concluding that the Substantial Participation Test
"overreaches").
171. See Mary M. Wynne, Primary Liability Amongst Secondary Actors: Why the Second
Circuit's "Bright Line" Standard Should Prevail, 44 ST. LOUiS U. L.J. 1607, 1625 (2000)
(discussing how fear of legal liability may lead lawyers and accountants to hesitate before
agreeing to help their clients with securities transactions).
172. Id. at 1625-26.
173. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (discussing the reliance
requirement).
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plaintiff relied on the misleading statements, 174 this test perhaps
oversteps the bounds of reasonableness in pursuing fairness and
disclosure in the markets. It is unclear how there can be damages if
there is no reliance on the misrepresentation.
The role of a secondary actor also affects liability under this
standard. The more intimate the relationship between a secondary
actor and the business, the more likely that the secondary actor will
be subject to liability. 175 This deters secondary actors from providing
services to firms involved in issuing securities. Again, the effect is to
increase costs of services, which reduces overall economic utility. For
example, in McGann v. Ernst & Young, the court rejected an
independent auditor's argument that liability should be limited to
those actually trading in securities.1 76 In essence, any party with any
level of involvement could be found liable if he knew or was reckless in
not knowing that there was a material misrepresentation being
created. Not only does this open to liability actors with minimal
involvement; it also increases the likelihood that more frivolous
lawsuits will be filed.
4. Creator Test
While the Creator Test was adopted by the very agency
charged with developing and enforcing securities law, it has only been
adopted by one district court. 177 The primary strength of the Creator
Test is that it tries to strike a balance between the narrow Bright Line
and Anixter Tests and the overly broad Substantial Participation Test.
Like the Anixter standard, the Creator Test avoids the safe
harbor problem inherent in the Bright Line Test. Under the SEC
standard, an actor need not be named on the document to be found
liable. If the actor assisted in creating the misrepresentation, he is
liable. By avoiding the attribution problem, the goals of honesty,
fairness, and disclosure in the market are achieved by eliminating the
incentive to disassociate oneself fraudulently from a document, which
exists under the Bright Line Test.1 78
174. See In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 973 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (describing the
shifting focus of the reliance requirement).

175. See Wynne, supra note 171, at 1625 (discussing problems with the Substantial
Participation Test).
176. McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 395 (9th Cir. 1996).
177. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 588 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
178. See Caskey, supra note 66, at 440. (arguing that the Creator Test "maintains market
integrity by offering a clear standard of liability aimed at those centrally involved in
misrepresentations to investors").
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The Creator Test arguably enhances predictability and
certainty by providing a clear meaning for the term "create." The SEC
gave concrete examples of "creation" when announcing its test in the
Klein brief, which the SEC filed as amicus curiae, in an attempt to
avoid the ambiguity problem that plagues the other standards. 17 9
Despite these examples, however, this test has been criticized for
using imprecise language.18 0 This concern stems from the fact that,
even with examples, "create" is still a word subject to manipulation
and interpretation, just like "makes," which has been criticized in
other tests. For example, the Creator Test has been praised for
"casting a wider net"18 1 than the other tests, yet the same
commentator emphasized that "the net could spread far and wide,
making the [Creator Test] a mere alternative version of the
18 2
Substantial Participation [T]est."
Excerpts from the Klein brief also indicate that under this
standard there likely would be less meritless litigation. Unlike the
broad Substantial Participation Test, under which an actor who did
not create a misrepresentation could nevertheless be found liable for
substantially participating in that creation, the SEC examples clearly
show that a secondary actor whose role was limited to drafting honest
portions of a document is free from liability, even if he or she knew
that other portions of the document were fraudulent, because he or
she did not create them. 8 3 A smaller volume of litigation would
conserve economic resources and would also incentivize secondary
actors to be honest in their actions, thus increasing market integrity.
It is worth noting, finally, that the SEC itself conceived the
Creator Test. Under traditional administrative law principles, courts
defer to agency interpretations of both organic statutes and their own
rules. 8 4 Thus far, this test has only been proffered in the Klein brief
and the Enron litigation in a Texas district court, so most courts have
not been confronted with the issue of acknowledging the level of
deference due the SEC. Admittedly, the private right of action is
judicially created, so courts are not required to defer to the SEC's

179. SEC Brief,supra note 27, at 14-15.
180. See Caskey, supra note 66, at 446 (arguing that the Creator Test still "need[s]
clarification").
181. Id. at 449.
182. Id.
183. SEC Brief,supra note 27, at 14-15.
184. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413 (1945) (stating that a "court
must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the

words used is in doubt").
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interpretation.1 8 5 However, it is equally important to remember that
the SEC is tasked with maintaining fair and honest markets, so its
opinion should be given some influential weight. If the Creator Test
were to gain wider acceptance, the SEC would be in a position to
address any problems without necessarily burdening the courts by
using its adjudication functions. However, this benefit is likely to
remain overlooked because the private right of action under Rule 10b18 6
5 was judicially created.
B. Rule l Ob-5(a) and (c) Schemes to DefraudAfter Stoneridge
The Supreme Court's framework for scheme liability is simple
in theory, but it still leaves much to be desired in its application and
will need to be fleshed out in future litigation. It is clear that reliance
is an important, required element in a Rule 10b-5 action in light of
Stoneridge.18 7 What is required to establish reliance, however, remains
a mystery.
In Stoneridge, the Court found that the connection between the
altered financial documents and the Stoneridge investors was too
attenuated to establish liability.18 8 This was held to be true even
though the suppliers knew or should have known that Charter was
going to use the altered documents in preparing its financial
statements for investors. This begs the question of how close the
"requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation
and a plaintiffs injury" 18 9 must be before reliance is found. Although
the Court implies that no specific oral or written statement is
necessary,1 90 the Court never states what is required. The likely result
is an increase in litigation as plaintiffs attempt to discover the
defining line, which may affect the costs of doing business.
185. The Business Roundtable has argued that judicial deference to the SEC on this issue is
inappropriate because: (1) Congress has consistently declined to follow the SEC's suggestions on
Rule 10b-5, indicating clear congressional intent; and (2) Congress has not delegated authority to
the SEC to create, or regulate, a private right of action under Rule lOb-5; it was a judicially
created right. Brief of the Business Roundtable as Amicus Curiae at 5, Stoneridge Inv. Partners,
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770 (2008) (No. 06-43), available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/06-43_RespondentAmCuBusRound.pdf.
186. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
187. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 ("Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant's
deceptive acts is an essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action.").
188. Id. (rejecting plaintiffs reliance argument because, "[w]ere this concept of reliance to be
adopted, the implied cause of action would reach the whole marketplace").
189. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988)).
190. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 ("If this conclusion were read to suggest there must be a
specific oral or written statement before there could be liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, it
would be erroneous.").
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Further, the Eighth Circuit's Duty Test, which the Stoneridge
Court adopted as a rebuttable presumption of reliance, is very narrow
in its application. By incorporating a duty analysis, this test remains
faithful to the original tort concepts that guide § 10(b) analysis.
However, this standard is imprecise because there is no definition of
the scope of the duty required. The Fifth Circuit in Regents of the
University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston did not define
the duty but stated that Enron had a duty to its shareholders while
the defendant banks did not.1 91 The court also implied that a
misleading statement is required, but a mere deceptive act is
insufficient, to satisfy the duty requirement. 192 Furthermore, a bank's
fiduciary duty to its clients is not enough to establish a legal duty
necessary for secondary-actor scheme liability. The Eighth Circuit was
more helpful, stating in In re Charter Communications,Inc., Securities
Litigation that the defendant vendors were not under a duty to
investors and analysts to disclose information useful in evaluating
Charter's true financial condition. 193 The Supreme Court, while
acknowledging the validity of the duty analysis, failed to provide any
194
clarity as to the origin of the duty.
This duty analysis is problematic because, like the safe harbor
concerns in misrepresentation claims under the Bright Line Test, the
Duty Test allows secondary actors to bypass liability as long as they
are not under a particular duty to provide accurate information. In
fact, this standard enables secondary actors to circumvent completely
the goals of honesty and fairness in the markets. This is exactly what
happened with Enron and Merrill Lynch in Regents, which devastated
investors like Schwartz who relied on Merrill Lynch. Because Merrill
Lynch owed no duty to Schwartz, he cannot recover damages against
Merrill Lynch, even though Merrill Lynch arguably is culpable and
should be held liable. As a result of experiences like that of Schwartz,
investors lose confidence in the market.

191. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372, 386 (5th Cir.
2007).

192. Id.
193. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir.
2006).
194. See generally Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
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IV. A UNITARY STANDARD OF LIABILITY THAT RESTORES THE AMERICAN
DREAM BY CHOPPING DOWN THE FOREST

A. The Need for a Unitary Standard
The courts of appeals have gone in vastly different directions in
response to the Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank regarding
secondary actor liability. Subsequent congressional and judicial
attempts at clarifying secondary actor liability have not been entirely
successful. The product has been inconsistency in the law, and the
resulting situation has been compared to a Hobson's choice for
securities lawyers. 195 It is easy to see how the existence of a variety of
different approaches allows creative lawyers to pursue claims against
secondary actors who otherwise might not have been sued at all. This
is not to say that expanding private securities litigation is inherently
bad, as some would argue; securities litigation can serve a legitimate
purpose, especially from the perspective of an investor like Buddy
Schwartz. 196 It provides defrauded investors with a remedy that might
not otherwise be available, despite the SOX Fair Funds provision.
Legitimate securities litigation also serves to increase the goals of
market transparency and honesty by preventing economic disasters
197
from repeating themselves.
However, the objectives of securities law-honesty, fairness,
disclosure, predictability, certainty, and economic efficiency-would be
better served if Congress were to adopt a single, unitary standard for
secondary actor liability that would apply equally to all Rule 10b-5
claims. This would eliminate the ability of creative lawyers to
continually expand the frontier of securities litigation by seeking
loopholes in precedent. Certainty and predictability would be the
hallmarks of such a unitary standard, and national uniformity would
increase economic efficiency because firms would know which
standard applies without worrying about the effects their operations

195. See Lisa H. Nicholson, A Hobson's Choice for Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron
Environment: Striking a Balance Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market
Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91, 101-03 (2002) (discussing how the current state of Rule
10b-5 liability allows securities lawyers to be sued for not disclosing their clients' fraudulent
misrepresentations).
196. Compare Rose, supra note 33, at 1363-64 (suggesting it is time to do away with private
securities litigation), with Brown, supra note 40, at 15 (promoting the benefits of private
securities litigation).
197. See Brown, supra note 40, at 15 (suggesting that failing to allow adequate private
securities litigation will lead to a repeat of events such as the stock market crash of 1929).
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in different jurisdictions have on their securities liability or worrying
about the possibility of forum shopping.
B. A Unitary Statutory Standard That Properly ProtectsInvestors
Any proposed standard must be broad enough to encompass
both misrepresentation and scheme-to-defraud Rule 10b-5 claims. It
must also remain true to the spirit and goals of § 10(b) by promoting
fairness and disclosure. The standard also must be specific enough to
avoid the ambiguities that hinder many of the existing tests while
requiring enough detail to survive a motion to dismiss under the
PSLRA. This Note offers a unitary statutory standard that attempts
to emulate the positive aspects of the existing tests while avoiding
their weaknesses. To this end, this Note suggests that Congress enact
a statute that would acknowledge the judicially created private right
of action while clarifying secondary liability for both the SEC and the
courts. A sample of such a statute is as follows:
Proposed 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(c).
A secondary actor is primarily liable for violating this section if he or she knowingly or
recklessly engages in any activity that has the effect of misrepresenting or omitting the
material information available to investors, or otherwise misleads investors through a
false appearance of fact, whether or not the actor is personally identified as engaging in
the activity. This standard includes a rebuttable presumption of investor reliance.
The SEC shall have power to enforce this provision. Individual citizens also have
a private right of action under this provision.

This standard achieves multiple goals. First, by including a
scienter element similar to that in the Anixter Test, 198 it ensures that
the only secondary actors held liable are those who know or should
have known that they were engaging in proscribed activity. This
protects the truly innocent actors like the Simpson vendors who did
not realize that AOL Time Warner was using their transactions to
"cook the books." 199 On the other hand, in Buddy Schwartz's case,
Buddy would be able to recover because Merrill Lynch should have
known that its transactions with Enron were proscribed.
Next, this standard shifts the focus of the analysis away from
the ambiguous concepts that plague the Creator and Bright Line
198. The scienter requirement for "knowingly or recklessly engag[ing] in an activity" is
aimed at those situations where the actor knew, or should have known, that their actions would
lead to a misrepresentation to investors. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215,
1225 (10th Cir. 1996).
199. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining
how alleged "triangular transactions" were conducted).
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Tests, such as whether the defendant "made" or "created" a
misrepresentation, and toward the actual effect of the activity.
Regardless of whether the secondary actor made or created a
misrepresentation or merely participated in activity he knew (or
should have known) would have the effect of misleading investors, he
is liable. This aspect is particularly helpful to investors like Schwartz,
who thus far have been under-protected by existing approaches.
Focusing on the effect of the underlying activity also comports with
200
the Supreme Court's continued adherence to a reliance requirement.
Although the Regents of the University of California court held that
Merrill Lynch and others did not owe Schwartz and the other
plaintiffs a duty and did not find the defendants liable, in a similar
case under this new standard, liability would exist because Merrill
Lynch should have known that the sham transactions would mislead
investors into believing Enron was in a better financial position than
it really was.
This standard also gives deference to the SEC. While several
Notes have advocated modifying the Creator Test as a starting point
to give deference to the SEC, 20 1 this Note suggests incorporating SEC
deference in a different manner. This standard utilizes the SEC's
definition of a "deceptive act" as declared in Simpson v. AOL Time
Warner. However, this standard removes the "principal purpose"
requirement and only requires a showing of a false appearance of fact
to establish a deceptive act; this would overcome the narrowness of
the Principal Purpose Test.
The proposed standard rejects the safe harbor inherent in the
Bright Line Test, clearly holding actors liable whether or not they are
identified with the fraudulent activity. This avoids the problem with
the Bright Line Test that arises when actors flout the law by avoiding
attribution. Without an attribution requirement, the standard is
broadened to properly reach any actor who behaves contrary to the
principles of fair and full disclosure.
Finally, this standard incorporates investor reliance through a
rebuttable presumption.
Similar to the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance announced in Basic, this standard balances

200. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008)
(describing reliance as an essential element of a § 10(b) cause of action).
201. See Caskey, supra note 66, at 449 (proposing modifying the Creator Test by including a
knowledge requirement and clarifying what it means to "create" a statement); Kimberly Brame,
Comment, Beyond Misrepresentations: Defining Primary and Secondary Liability Under
Subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, 67 LA. L. REV. 935, 954 (2007) (praising the Creator Test
for its "positive approach to behavioral economics and the law" but criticizing it as overly broad
and ambiguous).
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the need to protect investors from fraud against the need to prevent
meritless suits. Under this approach, once a plaintiff has met the
burden of showing that a secondary actor has knowingly engaged in
activity leading to material misrepresentations or a false appearance
of fact, the burden shifts to the secondary actor to show that the
plaintiff did not rely on the secondary actor's actions. While this
burden-shifting technique may be criticized as giving too great an
advantage to plaintiffs, it is important to remember that this
standard's inherent requirement of showing scienter is onerous on
plaintiffs in the first instance. Further, this burden shifting is
analogous to the technique the Supreme Court used in Basic and
approved in Stoneridge Investment Partners.20 2 While the Supreme
Court hesitated to expand a presumption of reliance beyond two
specific situations, 2 3 the promulgation of such a mandate by Congress
would eliminate the need for the Supreme Court continually to
redefine the boundaries of where presumptions of reliance apply.
Beyond the specific provisions of Proposed 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(c),
its major strength lies in its ability to blend the various standards of
secondary actor liability under Rule 10b-5 into a cohesive, uniform
application. This would significantly reduce litigation costs aimed at
finding creative solutions to divergent standards, which in turn would
increase judicial economic efficiency as fewer court resources are
wasted. Certainty and predictability would also be increased because
there would only be one standard, regardless of which circuit has
jurisdiction, thereby preventing forum shopping. This better conforms
to the notion of uniform regulation originally envisioned by
204
Congress.
This standard also promotes full and fair disclosure, leading to
more transparency and honesty in the market. The standard is broad
enough to reach any actor involved in fraudulent activity, but is
tailored enough to prevent meritless suits because of the interplay
between the scienter element of Proposed 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(c) on the
one hand and the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA on the
other. Through its focus on the effects of activity rather than the
semantics of "make" versus "create," the proposed addition allows
secondary actors to better appreciate whether their particular actions
202. The Court in Stoneridge Investment Partnersalso described a presumption of reliance
where an actor with a duty to disclose omits a material fact. 128 S. Ct. at 769.
203. The two specific situations are the fraud on the market theory and the duty to disclose
theory. Id.
204. The Constitution grants authority to Congress to impose uniform regulation on
Interstate Commerce (including the securities markets), U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which
Congress in turn delegates to the SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (2000).
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are likely to create liability for them. At the same time, it encourages
secondary actors to pursue only those activities that will lead to more
honesty in the market.
Notwithstanding that this standard is aggressive and may be
criticized as promoting over-deterrence, inconsistent with recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence, this proposal presents a solution that
protects investors and comports with the spirit of § 10(b). For
instance, the Stoneridge Court declined to find liability where the
defendant vendors were engaging in unusual transactions with
Charter, which used the transactions to inflate its revenues, because
205
the transactions were too tenuous to support reliance and causation.
Under this Note's proposal, reliance is presumed, which seemingly
overlooks the Court's requirement that reliance and causation be
connected. However, Proposed 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(c) addresses this issue
in a different way. Under this proposed standard, an actor must either
knowingly or recklessly engage in the activity with the result that
investors are misled. The knowledge or recklessness requirement of
the standard ensures that reliance and causation are connected,
because if a plaintiff cannot prove knowledge or recklessness, the
claim will fail. As a result, the focus will properly shift from the
actions of the victim to those of the secondary actor. Applying the
proposed standard to the facts of Stoneridge, it is reasonable to
assume that the defendant vendors should know that their
transactions with Charter would result in Charter "cooking the books"
and, in turn, that investors would be misled. Similarly, applying the
standard to the Schwartz case, Merrill Lynch would be found liable
because the firm not only helped Enron "cook the books," but it also
employed financial advisors who suggested to many clients including
Schwartz that they should purchase Enron stock. This is a clear
example of a case in which the defendant should have known that its
activities would mislead investors, and thus, its behavior was reckless.
This standard thus addresses the reliance and causation connection
concerns of the Stoneridge Court, and it does so in a manner that is
more likely to lead to favorable results for defrauded plaintiffs.
Another potential criticism of the proposed statute is that a
private right of action is unnecessary in light of the Fair Funds
provision of SOX that allows the SEC to distribute disgorged profits
from violators to the victims. Although Fair Funds could be very
beneficial to defrauded investors like Buddy Schwartz, this provision
has been criticized as being "limited in several different ways that
will, in a good many instances, prevent it from providing total
205. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.

2009]

PRIMARY LIABILITY FOR SECONDARYACTORS

309

restitution to investors harmed as consequence of a violation."20 6 The
Fair Funds provision is especially limited in the secondary actor
context because "no part of the civil fine imposed upon co-violators,
who avoided disgorgement because they did not benefit from their
misconduct, would be made available to their victims." 20 7 Thus, some
form of a private right of action, as advocated in this Note, must
remain viable.
Proposed 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(c) would solve many of the problems
currently associated with Rule 10b-5 litigation while avoiding the
problems of ambiguity and safe harbors. The standard also comports
with the various policy goals advocated by Congress, the SEC, and the
Supreme Court. While advancing these goals, this standard better
protects investors like Schwartz.
V. CONCLUSION

The Central Bank decision has caused a great deal of confusion
and disagreement, simultaneously simplified and complicated by
Stoneridge, over the proper standard for secondary actor liability
under Rule 10b-5. This Note proposes a new statutory standard that
complies with the Central Bank distinction between primary and
secondary liability while remaining faithful to the goals of securities
laws. Meeting these goals is essential for the future of the securities
markets.
Unfortunately, the conflict over the proper scope of secondary
actor liability has not been without its casualties. It has been said that
"[t]he only ones who profit in the end are the lawyers." 208 While this
may be true, the sad reality is that many innocent, hard-working
investors like Schwartz are the ones who ultimately pay the price.
Current securities law jurisprudence has failed to preserve the
honesty and fairness of the market when a man like Schwartz can lose
his entire retirement without recourse against one of the primary
participants in the fraudulent scheme that deprived him of much of
his savings. Often courts have been too focused on the forest to notice
the trees.
This proposal, while not retroactively restoring Schwartz's
retirement, will help to ensure the financial security of millions of
other hard-working Americans by providing a remedy in addition to

206. Cox & Thomas, supranote 158, at 742.
207. Id. at 754.
208. Brown, supra note 40, at 15 (quoting Bankers Ethics, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2005, at
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that provided by Fair Funds under SOX. In the unfortunate event that
a fraudulent scheme or misrepresentation deprives innocent
employees like Schwartz of their savings, the unitary standard
promises to help them regain some of their financial losses from any
actor who defrauded them and should have known better. This safety
net is essential to achieve fair and honest markets for everyone. That
is the essence of the American Dream.
Robert John Grubb Ir
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